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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
despite it. That which Connecticut regards as active continuing negligence to
(active negligent acts subsequent to the contributory negligence which caused
the perilous situation) seems to be in reality but a continuation of that original
contributory negligence rather than what is meant by continuing negligence.
TORTS-NUISANCE-CASTING OF LIGHT ON ADJOINING LAND
AS NUISANCE
Plaintiff, operator of a drive-in, outdoor, motion picture theater, brought
a suit in trespass 1 and nuisance against a race track operator, alleging that
the light cast from defendant's race track invaded his property and interfered
with the reasonable use of his land in its natural condition, i.e., darkness. De-
fendant claimed that a reasonable use of his land caused injury to the plaintiff
only because of the delicate use to which the plaintiff had put his land. The
defendant had a directed verdict in the trial court. Held, on appeal, judgment
affirmed. Since plaintiff's use of'his land was of a peculiarly delicate and sensi-
tive nature, there was neither trespass nor nuisance. Amphitheaters, Inc. v.
Portland Meadows, 198 P.2d 847 (Ore. 1948).
There are few cases discussing this type of interference when it results
from a clash of commercial interests. 2 Most of the precedents involve the con-
flict between a commercial interest and the enjoyment of residential property.3
In the instant case, the court drew a distinction on the basis of whether
the property was being put to a residential or a commercial use.4 The real
distinction, it would seem, should be the effect on the user. Assuming that
the adjoining landowner is making a reasonable use of his land, a residential
user "highly susceptible" to smoke,5 sounds 1 or similar interference is analo-
gous to commercial user engaged in a particular enterprise which may demand
10. Ibid.
1. 39 Am. Jur. 282: "Thus, where there is no actual physical invasion of the
plaintiff's property, the cause of action is for nuisance rather than trespass."
2. The Shelburne, Inc. v. Crossan, 95 N.J. Eq. 188, 122 AtI. 749 (1923); Wallace &
Tiernan, Inc. v. United States Cutlery Co., 97 N.J. Eq. 408, 128 Atl. 872 (1925) Bradbury
Marble Co. v. Laclede Gas Light Co., 128 Mo. App. 96, 106 S.W. 594 (1907); Noyes v.
Huron & Erie Mtg. Corp., [1932] Ont. L. R. 426, 3 D.L.R. 143; Kine v. Jolly, 1 Ch. D.
480 (1905) ;Eastern & South African Telegraph Co. v. Cape Town Tramways Companies,
L.R., A.C. 381, 36 Digest 188, 313 (1902) ; Robinson v. Kilvert, 41 Ch. D. 88 (1889).
3. Kellogg v. Mertens, 30 So.2d 777 (La. App. 1947) ; Nugent v. Melville Shoe Corp.,
980 Mass. 469, 182 N.E. 825 (1932), noted 7 U. OF CIN. L. REv. 192 (1933); Shepler
v. Kansas Milling Co., 128 Kau. 554, 278 Pac. 757 (1929). The usual situation is that of
a property owner versus night spectator sports, Board of Education of Louisville v.
Klein, 303 Ky. 234, 197 S.W.2d 427 (1946); Hansen v. Independent School Dist. No. I,
61 Idaho 109, 98 P.2d 959 (1939) ; Casteel v. Town of Afton, 277 Iowa 61, 287 N.W.
245 (1939); Warren Co. v. Dickson, 185 Ga. 481, 195 S.E. 568 (1938) ; Russell v.
Nostrand Athletic Club, 212 App. Div. 543. 209 N.Y. Supp. 76 (1925). Or again, the
disturbance of sleep resulting from lights shining into sixty hotel rooms from a sign, The
Shelburne, Inc. v. Crossan, Corp., supra.
4. Cases cited note 3 sutra; in each case cited the court based its decision on the
effect of a reasonable use of the property to persons of ordinary sensibilities.
5. Bradbury Marble Co. v. Laclede Gas Light Co., snpra.
6. Russell v. Nostrand Athletic Club, supra.
CASES NOTED
freedom from heat invasions 7 or ordinary vibration from a generator, here
called a delicate user.
The principal case relied upon English and Empire cases 9 in explaining
delicate use of property. "A person cannot, by applying his property to special
and extraordinary uses or purposes, whether for business or pleasure, restrict
the right of his neighbour in the ordinary and legitimate enjoyment of his
property ...or impose upon his neighbour burdens which in the ordinary
course of things, he is not called upon to bear .. ." " An extraordinary user
includes a non-natural user.'0 This definition appears to apply to both parties
in the instant litigation. Further, such a definition imposes liability when an
owner or occupier by his active agency interferes with the normal state of, or
imposes an additional burden upon the premises of his neighbor.1 ' It would
appear that defendant's lights created an additional burden upon the premises
of the plaintiff. The court should have discarded its artificial approach for
one which emphasized the equities involved from the statement of facts. By
its very nature, light will affect the normal operations of an outdoor theater
dependent upon the natural darkness of the premises after nightfall. By sub-
jecting the premises to such outside influences, it is submitted that the court
penalized a modern, highly developed enterprise.
The court upheld the directed verdict for the defendant, on the basis of
a crystallization of legal opinion as to the gravity of the harm as opposed to
the utility of the actor's conduct 12 when the doctrine of delicate user applies,
though the legitimacy of applying the doctrine to this set of facts seems doubt-
ful. It would appear that a jury determination based upon a balancing of the
conflicting interests would be preferable to a judicial determination relying
upon a mechanistic application of legal theory in this type situation.
The question also arises as to whether darkness 13 is the natural condition,
any disturbance of which may constitute a nuisance if it interferes with the
enjoyment of the land. The courts do not seem to have approached the problem
from this point of view but have considered only whether there was an op-
pressive imposition of a burden on a residential user which would occasion a
right to damages or injunctive relief. 14 The court in the instant case reasoned
7. Robinson v. Kilvert, supra.
8. Wallace & Tiernan, Inc. v. United States Cutlery Co., supra, where there was
disturbance of delicate instruments.
9. Eastern & South African Telegraph Co. v. Cape Town Tramways Companies,
supra; Robinson v. Kilvert, supra; Kine v. Jolly, supra.
9a. Halsbury's Laws of England, vol. VVIV, p. 45 § 78 (Hailsham ed. 1937).
10. Id. at § 79, p. 45: "Extraordinary user .... [ (includes) I . . .the alteration or use
of the premises for unusual or non-natural purposes .
11. Halsbury's Laws, § 80.
12. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 826, comment d (1939).
13. "The fact that the plaintiff in this case loves darkness rather than light does
not mean that light can be classed as a noxious or generally injurious instrumentality."
Amphitheaters, Inc. v. Portland Meadows, 198 P.2d 847, 854 (Ore. 1948).
14. Nugent v. Melville Shoe Corp., suta. Refused in Casteel v. Town of Afton,
supra, where the court in rejecting the plea of nuisance caused by lights in a playground,
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that any business, no matter how highly developed,' requiring freedom from
such outside interferences as noise, light, and vibration, is to be classified as
a delicate business and thus not entitled to relief unless the burdens are of
a special and unreasonable nature. It would seem that darkness is a natural
state which all landowners are entitled to enjoy if they so choose. In the
instant case, the artificial light used was not the ordinary illumination to
which one might expect to be subjected as an incident to societal life. Rather,
it was an unusually strong glow. Such distinction, however, was rejected by
the court which said: "The conditions of modern city life imposed upon the
city dweller and his property many burdens more severe than that of light
reflected upon him or it." tO Such a view appears severe when its result is
to deprive a business of the reasonable use of its land.' 7
It is submitted that the courts, in determining the problems of a modern
industrial enterprise requiring freedom from outside interferences, should
consider the nature of the interests involved, rather than predicate their de-
cisions upon formalized reasoning.
TORTS-RIGHT OF PRIVACY IN SURVIVORS OF DECEASED PUBLIC
FIGURE AFTER CONSIDERABLE TIME LAPSE
In 1905, plaintiffs' father disappeared under suspicious circumstances
from his home in Tuscaloosa, Alabama. A member of the community was
imprisoned as a muirder suspect for five months and then released because
the body could not be traced or found.
Twenty five years later, in 1930, the testator of a will probated in Cali-
fornia proved to be plaintiffs' missing father, and his body was then returned
to Tuscaloosa. In 1946, sixteen years thereafter, defendant radio station
broadcast on a local commercial radio program a sketch, description, and
history of the private and family life of the plaintiffs, including the peculiar
circumstances of their father's disappearance and return.
said, "The lights referred to are necessary to night games and would not constitute a
great inconvenience to the ordinary dweller in a town." Id. at 246.
15. In Eastern & South African Telegraph Company v. Cape Town Tramways
Companies, srpra, the plaintiff was injured by escaping electric currents from defendant's
lines until he took the precaution of installing modern equipment. The case of Noyes v.
Huron & Erie Mtg. Corp., supra, had to do with the application of an experimental device
called the projectorscope, to outdoor advertising. The court called attention to the
experimental nature of the equipment in refusing damages to the plaintiff due to dispersal
of light caused by defendant's floodlights illuminating his own building.
16. Amphitheaters, Inc. v. Portland Meadows, supra at 858.
17. Wallace & Tiernan, Inc. v. United States Cutlery Co., stpra, where it was held
that the nature of the plaintiff's business was not a defense to vibration caused by de-
fendant which interfered with the calibration of delicate instruments; accord, Western
Silver Fox Ranch v. Ross & Cromarty County Council, S.C. 601-Scot. (1940), where the
Scottish court applied Rylands v. Fletcher (1868), L.R., H.L. 330, to a case of blasting
by a contractor employed by the county, which frightened vixens on a silver fox farm
causing them to destroy their cubs or abort. That court rejected the non-natural use of
the land by the plaintiff as a defense.
